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Abstract
This essay discusses the Julietta gold mining project and the categories of risk that investors
and lenders look at when assessing the suitability of a project. The financing of projects on a
limited recourse basis in the emerging markets is a subject that has received much attention over the
course of the last several years. This has been particularly the case with respect to mining projects
where declining commodity prices worldwide have led to the need for mining companies to access
minerals in countries where the costs of extraction are lower than in the developed markets. The
recent decline in the popularity of hedging as a means to enhance the attained price with respect
to any metal produced at a project has only accelerated this trend. This has led to a concentration
on the development of projects in sub-Saharan Africa, the former Soviet Union, South East Asia,
and–although now less of an emerging market– South America.
THE JULIETTA GOLD MINING PROJECT:
LESSONS FOR PROJECT FINANCE IN
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INTRODUCTION
The recent closing of the financing for the Julietta gold
mine in the Magadan Oblast of Russia has attracted significant
attention and comment in each of the financial, mining, and le-
gal communities. Work in connection with the financing of the
project commenced in 1996. Four years, two owners, several
bank syndicates, and multiple financing structures later, the fi-
nancing finally closed in September 2000. This Essay describes
the tortuous history of the project and its financing, and goes on
to address some of the issues that were faced in the context of
problems generally encountered in the financing of projects in
the emerging markets.
The Julietta gold mining project is situated in one of the
most inhospitable areas of the world. Located in the Magadan
Oblast of Russia (in the far east of that country, almost as far as
the Kamchatka Peninsula), the project is significantly closer to
Alaska than Moscow. The nearest evidence of civilisation is the
city of Magadan, located many kilometres to the south of the
project. The project is capable of access by road for only part of
the year. During the extreme winter, climatic conditions mean
that the project must be accessed by helicopter, although an ice
road has been constructed to alleviate this problem. The attrac-
tion of the area to that group of explorers known as "gold bugs"
is that the geology in the area is such as to encourage the forma-
tion of gold and other precious metal deposits. One gold mine
(the Kubaka project) is already up and running in the region.
In 1996 Arian Resources Corporation, a company based in
Canada, owned the Julietta project, and it was with that entity
that the original bank group (led by Standard Bank London
Limited, the London based subsidiary of the large South African
bank) set off to structure and implement the financing. What
were the problems that were faced? First and foremost, the pro-
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ject is located in Russia. Beyond the hostile physical environ-
ment, the legal system in that country is in the very early stages
of development, and a definitive analysis of rights and remedies
frequently defies standards familiar to European and North
American lawyers. There also are a plethora of constituencies
that need to be satisfied. Both the federal government based in
Moscow and the local government based in Magadan need to be
kept informed, and a variety of consents need to be issued by
regulatory authorities within those governments.
As an emerging economy, the export of foreign exchange is
severely limited. Gold is sold in the international markets for
U.S. dollars, and both foreign investors and foreign lenders re-
quire that the project have the ability to remit U.S. dollars
outside Russia both to provide a return on the equity investment
and in order to repay the project loans. Accordingly, extensive
negotiations with the Russian Central Bank-the regulatory au-
thority with jurisdiction over the remission of foreign exchange
from Russia-were required. To compound the problem, gov-
ernments jealously guard gold and other precious metals and
extensive consents are required in order to sanction their extrac-
tion, refining, and sale.
In common with all such projects that are now seeking fi-
nancing in the private arena, the Russian governmental authori-
ties originally owned the assets constituting the Julietta project.
The assets were privatised several years ago, and therefore, the
initial legal task was to ensure that the privatization had effec-
tively and legally occurred. There are several horror stories that
have happened in the past (and which continue to occur) where
privatisation of private sector projects have not taken place thor-
oughly in accordance with Russian law and procedure with the
result that title to the relevant assets have been under attack by a
variety of vested interests in Russia and elsewhere. (Indeed, at
the time work on the Julietta project commenced in 1996, one of
the largest potential gold deposits in the world-the Sukhoi Log
deposit located in Siberia-was experiencing a similar problem.)
The problem is compounded by virtue of the fact that some of
the laws relating to privatisation are not easily available, nor are
records relating to the method in which the privatisation has
been accomplished.
The original bank syndicate, led by Standard Bank, labored
through the legal and regulatory issues involved for some consid-
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erable period of time until the position was reached where all
involved felt able to close the transaction in the summer of 1998.
Finding lenders willing to participate in a facility of this nature
had obviously been a challenge, although a group was ultimately
put together, political risk insurance obtained, and other rele-
vant issues taken care of. Unfortunately, virtually simultaneously
with the proposed closing, Russia defaulted on its sovereign
debt, and there followed an immediate collapse in the availabil-
ity of the capital markets and other credit sources to Russian bor-
rowers. As a result, the financing did not close.
The ensuing period saw virtually no availability of credit for
anything with a Russian flavor, never mind a yet-to-be-con-
structed gold mining project in Magadan. The existing owner
sold its interest in the project to Bema Gold Corporation, a min-
ing company based in Vancouver on the west coast of Canada.
Bema had experience with the development of mining projects
in equally inhospitable environments, such as the Andes. In late
1999, and with the (relative) decline in concern about projects
in Russia, the attempt to finance the project re-commenced.
Standard Bank reorganized the lending syndicate bringing in
the large Munich based bank Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank
AG as a co-arranger of the financing.
In its original incarnation, the financing had been organ-
ized as one that would be supplied solely by commercial banks.
In the new environment in Russia following the 1998 crisis, it was
felt prudent to involve a multi-lateral lender, and the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation ("IFC") agreed to participate in the
financing. However, unlike other projects in the emerging mar-
kets involving the multi-laterals where the multi-lateral in ques-
tion fronts the entire loan to be effectively funded in part by
commercial banks, the structure utilized in the Julietta project
financing involved two separate (but parallel) loan agreements
with the commercial lending group and the IFC. It is under-
stood that this was a first for projects in Russia.
The principal risk to be covered off in connection with a
transaction such as the Julietta project is political risk, particu-
larly given the level of concern about political stability in Russia
and the perceived ability of Russian governmental departments
to interfere with the smooth running of any project located in
the country. The Multilateral Insurance Guarantee Agency
("MIGA"), which is an arm of the World Bank, was approached
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to provide political risk insurance for the commercial banks.
This was ultimately secured, thereby taking care of an area of
substantial concern for that group of lenders. With this in place,
the financing and legal teams swung into full action in late
1999/early 2000. Faced with very real timing deadlines, due to
the fact that construction of the project was scheduled to take
place during the summer months prior to the onset of the win-
ter icepack, all involved worked throughout 2000 to attempt to
accomplish a closing to address that practicality.
With this factual background, what can be learned from the
project? In order to answer this question we need to understand
the categories of risk that investors and lenders look at when
assessing the suitability of a project. The financing of projects
on a limited recourse basis in the emerging markets is a subject
that has received much attention over the course of the last sev-
eral years. This has been particularly the case with respect to
mining projects where declining commodity prices worldwide
have lead to the need for mining companies to access minerals
in countries where the costs of extraction are lower than in the
developed markets. The recent decline in the popularity of
hedging as a means to enhance the attained price with respect to
any metal produced at a project has only accelerated this trend.
This has led to a concentration on the development of projects
in sub-Saharan Africa, the former Soviet Union, South East Asia,
and-although now less of an emerging market-South
America.
I. CATEGORIES OF RISK ADDRESSED WHEN ASSESSING THE
SUITABILITY OF A PROJECT
The problems inherent in financing mining projects on a
limited recourse basis in the emerging markets are well re-
hearsed. Some of these problems are described generically be-
low. We will then go on to explore how some of these issues
were addressed in connection with the Julietta project.
A. Legal System Risk
The basis of the legal systems utilized in the various emerg-
ing markets is diverse. In many of the countries of the former
English Commonwealth located in sub-Saharan Africa, an En-
glish based common law system prevails. Thus, for example,
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transactions involving projects in Ghana and Zambia might be
structured on the basis of traditional English law concepts of tak-
ing security and attendant filings, etc. In Francophone countries
in the same region, such as Mali and Mauritania, French civil law
systems are common, frequently based substantially on the
French Civil Code. In each of these jurisdictions where the legal
system is based on an established Western European model,
there is some certainty as to the theoretical operation of the le-
gal system and the necessary filings, etc. However, practical op-
eration of the legal system and remedies available upon the oc-
currence of an event of default, etc., may still be problematic. In
South America a civil based system is common and frequently
affords a very developed system of law. In the former Soviet
Union, the situation has evolved with far less clarity due to the
uncertain nature of both the laws involved and the interpreta-
tion thereof. The developing nature of the legal system and the
almost complete absence of precedents with respect to remedies
available in the event of a default or similar problem compound
the problem.
Practically, of course, a lender must take the legal system as
it exists. There is no way of contracting around statutory re-
quirements. The only real method of ameliorating any difficul-
ties presented by legal systemic risk are by retaining sponsor sup-
port past completion for any perceived legal risk, which is unac-
ceptable to a sponsor from a credit perspective, and by taking
the benefit of political risk insurance to guard against the precip-
itous act of any local government or related body.
B. Title Risk
Part and parcel of legal risk is the nature of the right of the
mining company in question to develop the deposit that forms
the basis of the mining project. In some countries, the mining
company might have full legal right to both surface and sub-sur-
face assets together with the unrestricted right to exploit those
assets. However, this is unusual in the context of the emerging
markets. Frequently, the ownership right in minerals is vested in
the central government, and all that can be obtained is a license
to mine the minerals in question. In some jurisdictions, for ex-
ample the Russian Federation, the situation is exaggerated by
virtue of the fact that the operator will be unable to obtain even
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surface rights., It will merely be granted whatever attendant
rights are necessary in order to effectively mine the deposit pur-
suant to the mining license granted by the -government.
In many countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the
central government will have the right to retain a carried interest
in the project, maybe in a proportion of up to 20% of the equity.
In other jurisdictions, this interest may take the form of a royalty
payment to the government in respect to minerals extracted
from the ground. Whatever the format, virtually all emerging
markets will require that some 'economic interest in the project
be granted to the central government. This is clearly under-
standable as mineral resources may represent the most signifi-
cant, if not sole, source of wealth for those countries.
C. Tax Risk
Potential taxes assessable on a mining project are numer-
ous. The local project company may be subject to a profits tax,
value added tax ("VAT") on services, or other forms of local taxa-
tion. In addition, there may be withholding taxes on interest
and dividend payments made offshore. Fortunately, most
emerging markets recognize the economic advantages in at-
tracting offshore mining companies to develop deposits, and
therefore offer tax packages for individual projects that are avail-
able to be negotiated on a project-by-project basis. These will
frequently result in tax holidays in connection with profit and
related taxes in addition to exemptions from VAT and withhold-
ing tax on both interest payments and dividends.
D. Political Risk
This, again, is something that may not be contracted out of
and, therefore, must be covered by the sponsors or by insurance.
The former will be resisted for balance sheet and precedential
reasons. The latter may be available through one of the multilat-
eral agencies (for example, and as utilized in connection with
the Julietta project, MIGA), through a national export credit
agency from the home jurisdiction of a participant in the pro-
ject, or in the commercial markets. Political risk coverage is
available for the majority of the emerging markets, even those
perceived to be -riskier than most, such as' the' Russian Federa-
tion. Of course, some emerging markets have now emerged.
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So, for example, whereas political risk insurance for transactions
in Chile may have been common several years ago, that may no
longer be the benchmark. Deals in certain sub-Saharan Africa
countries such as Ghana also have been completed without any
perceived need for political risk insurance. The insurance is fre-
quently expensive and can add significantly to the cost of any
individual project financing.
E. Insurance Risk
Comprehensive insurance for any particular project is an es-
sential part of the package that will be required by any provider
of limited recourse finance. Prima facie this should not create
any difficulty as commercial insurance for a project (third party
liability, construction risk, delay in start-up, etc.) should be avail-
able irrespective of location. However, a complication arises by
virtue of the fact that many of the emerging markets (particu-
larly in sub-Saharan African and the former Soviet Union) re-
quire that the primary insurance be provided by a local insur-
ance company. This raises both performance and credit risk is-
sues.
While such local insurance will be reinsured by coverage in
more traditional insurance markets, such as the London market,
that is not the end of the problem. For example, reinsurance is
just that: it is a secondary cover with respect to the primary in-
surance policy. Accordingly, if the primary insurance policy is
not valid, then neither will the reinsurance. In those jurisdic-
tions (such as Russia) where the primary insurance with the local
insurance provider must be governed by local law, then comfort
must be obtained with respect to the validity and efficacy of that
insurance. Note that these issues will not be circumvented by
the so-called "cut through" provision present in many reinsur-
ance arrangements, which provides for the reinsurers to pay ben-
eficiaries of the primary insurance policy directly rather than be-
ing put through the necessity to pay through the primary insurer
as a conduit.
F. Foreclosure Risk
The analysis of the risks inherent in any project in the
emerging or other markets frequently ends, at least from a legal
perspective, with the documentation. However, this is short-
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sighted. Enforceable documentation is obviously critical to any
project lender, but this does not give the whole picture. The
rights available in connection with any enforcement of that doc-
umentation are paramount. The traditional common law analy-
sis, for example, assumes that any secured party will have a self-
help remedy that will enable it to sell the secured asset on its
own motion without the need to involve any third party. In civil
law countries, and in most emerging markets other than those
sub-Saharan countries with an English common law tradition,
this is not possible. In those jurisdictions no self-help remedy is
available, and foreclosure will usually need to be performed with
the assistance of the court system. This usually implies an auc-
tion following some defined period and can involve a lengthy
delay. During a period when a project is in trouble and unable
to meet the needs of its trade creditors, this can be a significant
issue. In addition, some auction procedures may not permit the
lenders to bid in debt, rather than bidding in cash, thus poten-
tially materially increasing the exposure of the lenders to the
project as a whole if they wish to avoid defeating some wholly
inadequate bid made at auction by a third party.
G. Foreign Currency and Export Risk
While governments in the majority of South American and
many African countries will issue licenses with respect to any par-
ticular project that will permit the unfettered sale of metal off-
shore and deposit of proceeds in an offshore account, this may
not apply to other jurisdictions, particularly those in the former
Soviet Union. In those countries and particularly in the case of
projects including precious metals, the mined metal may have to
be sold through a local agent, which will result in the collection
of domestic currency. In addition, there may be restrictions on
the holding of foreign currency offshore.
II. RISK ASSESSMENT AS ADDRESSED IN THE
JULIETA PROJECT
Many of the difficulties faced by lenders and sponsors in
Russia are not unusual for a project finance transaction in an
emerging market. However, due to a legal heritage and culture
derived from Russia's communist past, combined with the mea-
sures introduced following the Russian debt crisis in 1998, the
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solutions to these problems are often more complex, time con-
suming, and ultimately, more expensive than those found in
other jurisdictions. Some of the difficulties associated with the
development and project financing of theJulietta project are dis-
cussed below.
A. Sale of Mine Output
This issue has given rise to a number of difficulties over the
past few years. For example, in 1998 it was reported that a sub-
sidiary of Kinross Gold Co. was forced to stop production at its
Kubaka mine as a result of difficulties in selling gold and silver
produced at the mine. Russian law requires precious metals to
be sold either locally to a federal agency (Gokhran) or to an
authorized Russian bank. Gokhran has a right of first refusal to
purchase all precious metals produced in Russia or offshore
through an authorized Russian bank. Some local government
agencies (e.g., in Magadan) also have a right of first refusal to
purchase precious metals produced within their jurisdiction.
Importantly, a percentage of the precious metals sold either lo-
cally (e.g., to Gokhran) or offshore through an authorized Rus-
sian bank must be paid for in Roubles. The actual percentage
paid is determined by the Central Bank of Russia and is normally
a significant amount (more than 50%) of the project output.
This leads to an additional cost in transferring Roubles into hard
currency. There also is the risk that the Central Bank may in-
crease the percentage of the precious metals that must be sold
for in Roubles, that Roubles may not be convertible into hard
currency, or that the Dollar/Rouble market may not be liquid
enough to purchase hard currency.
B. Currency Issues
Ownership of foreign currency by Russian citizens and com-
mercial entities has been highly regulated following the debt cri-
sis of 1998. The amount of foreign currency that may be held by
mining project companies is a matter of negotiation with the
Central Bank of Russia. A typical structure would involve per-
mission to hold an offshore and an onshore Dollar account.
The offshore account might be kept either with the foreign
branch of a Russian bank or with a foreign bank. The Central
Bank will only permit a limited amount of foreign currency to be
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held in the offshore account. The Central Bank also has indi-
cated that it is more comfortable with an offshore account being
held in a foreign branch of a Russian bank-meaning they will
allow more funds to be held offshore in U.S. dollars. This has
obvious credit implications and would need to be weighed up by
sponsors and lenders. Normally, an onshore Dollar denomi-
nated account can only be used for Dollar payments that are due
to be paid within seven days of the transfer from Roubles into
U.S. dollars. The remaining funds owned by the project com-
pany must be held in Roubles. This could be a significant
amount of money and project companies need to structure their
working capital with this issue in mind.
C. Security of Tenure
A number of existing and proposed mines are, or have
been, the subject of privatization. There have been at least two
well-publicized cases (Dukat and Sukhoi Log) that have demon-
strated some of the serious difficulties associated with the priva-
tization of Russian mining enterprises. Russian law prescribes a
number of key requirements for privatization and their violation
may provide grounds for invalidation of the privatization. These
requirements include the following elements:
1. the privatization of the enterprise must not be restricted,
2. the relevant state bodies must have approved the priva-
tization,
3. the privatization procedures to be followed and privatiza-
tion options selected must be in accordance with certain
detailed regulations,
4. the proper evaluation and publication of information,
and
5. the proper establishment of the enterprise to be priva-
tized.
The rules for each of these elements are detailed and require a
significant amount of due diligence. Obviously the invalidation
of a privatization would be catastrophic, and lenders and spon-
sors should be careful to pursue a detailed due diligence process
to minimize the risk of the privatization of a mining project be-
ing set aside.
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D. Security
Russia has a number of mandatory laws that cause difficul-
ties for lenders taking security over the assets of a mining pro-
ject. It is very difficult to take effective security over bank ac-
count balances, which are crucial to a project financing. It also
is not possible to take security over mining licenses, and lenders
are prohibited from taking security over business interruption
insurance, which is also critical to many mining projects.
The lack of security over these types of assets is particularly
disastrous if the project company becomes bankrupt and third
party creditors have a claim against the project company. In the
event of a bankruptcy, third party creditors will have an equal
claim to project lenders against such insurances, bank account
balances, and mining licenses. In order to avoid this situation,
lenders should ensure that the project company is only permit-
ted to incur a very small amount of third party debt.
Enforcement by secured creditors is also very difficult in
Russia. Enforcement without a court order is virtually impossi-
ble, and obtaining a court order can take a significant amount of
time.
E. Insurance
Like many other emerging markets, Russian insurance law
only permits Russian entities to take out insurances with Russian
insurance companies. Although not an' unusual requirement in
an emerging market, Russian insurance law has some added
complexities that must be dealt with by sponsors and financiers.
Lenders in particular normally are reluctant to take on the
added layer of local risk that results from insurances being is-
sued by a local company. The normal method of avoiding this
risk is to require the local insurance company to take out faculta-
tive re-insurances of the underlying insurance policies with an
international reinsurer (e.g., Lloyds). The local insurer also is
required by lenders to grant a security assignment over such re-
insurances in favor of the project lenders. This gives the project
lenders the comfort of a direct claim (via the assignment of rein-
surances) to an international insurer, rather than a local insurer.
This structure, while viable in Russia, is not desirable. Gen-
erally speaking, contracts (including insurance agreements) be-
tween two Russian entities must -be governed by Russian law.
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This gives rise to an added layer of Russian risk as lenders and
sponsors will be accustomed to insurance policies issued under
English or United States law. Further, it is not clear that Russian
insurance law is comparable to English or U.S. law, or that Rus-
sian insurance law recognizes standard international insurance
concepts such as "lender's interest" clauses or loss payee provi-
sions. Additionally, the assignment of reinsurances requires the
special permission of the Russian Central Bank, which is both
difficult and time consuming to obtain.
In any event, there is some doubt as to whether such an
assignment is enforceable-Russian law does not permit the
benefit of a reinsurance contract to be transferred to any entity
other than a Russian insurance company. It is not clear if this
would also extend to any debts payable under such a re-insur-
ance policy (which is normally the subject of the assignment of
re-insurances).
Finally, as a practical matter, payments of claims under Rus-
sian insurance policies must be paid in Roubles, adding another
level of currency risk to the project.
One method for lenders to mitigate some of the risks men-
tioned in the preceding paragraphs is to obtain some form of
offshore insurance for the lenders (as opposed to the project
company's) insurable interest, e.g., through a "non-admitted" or
"difference in coverage" policy. Unfortunately such a policy
does add an additional cost to the project. It also adds a level of
complexity to the insurances, as it is necessary to co-ordinate any
offshore insurances with any local policies.
CONCLUSION
Although Russia remains a difficult market, project finance
transactions, as illustrated by the Julietta experience, are possi-
ble. Unfortunately, the "solution" commercial banks will most
likely require for a number of the risks outlined above is an in-
creased return (i.e., margin) and/or additional sponsor support
(i.e., through the assumption of some risks). However, success-
ful completion of projects is possible and, with the news that this
is possible in Russia, the final frontier in the emerging markets
may have been breached.
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